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Japan’s Reemployment System
and Work Incentives for the Elderly∗
Shinya Kajitani †
Abstract
This paper clarifies the features of the Japanese reemployment system. We examine
the impact of this system on employees’ incentive to continue to work for their current
firms after mandatory retirement. Using two large microdata sets for Japanese firms and
workers, this paper shows that: 1) for the firms with a reemployment system, the steeper
the slope of the wage profile until mandatory retirement, the more wages decrease on
reemployment, and 2) although a worker’s wage on reemployment decreases, the wage
reduction on reemployment does not necessarily make the workers in small/mid-size
firms leave their current firm.
JEL classification: J14; J26; J33
Keywords: The labor supply of elderly workers; Mandatory retirement;
Reemployment system; Wage reduction; Work incentive.
1 Introduction
The population is rapidly aging due to prolonged longevity in Japan. Ohashi (1998) discussed
the theoretical relation between the worker’s optimal retirement age and prolonged longevity, and
recommended that the mandatory retirement age be extended in response to this longevity. Most
firms set a mandatory retirement age in Japan. According to the “2004 Personnel Management
Survey (Ko¯yo Kanri Cho¯sa)” conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 91.5% of
firms with more than 30 employees have a mandatory retirement age. In the 2006 legislation,
the Japanese government imposed job security for employees until the age of 65. However, most
firms are not willing to extend the mandatory retirement age. The institutional obligation to extend
the mandatory retirement age merely forces firms to add to the overall cost of hiring the elderly,
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writing this paper. I am also grateful to Colin McKenzie, Yoshio Okunishi, Kei Sakata, and Wataru Suzuki for their
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because this cost causes “overpayment.” According to the well-known theory of Lazear (1979), the
joint gains of a firm and workers from long-term contracts are maximized at mandatory retirement.
The firms are no longer willing to pay the elderly their current wage. In addition, hiring the elderly
can cost more simply because the productivity of workers may decrease as they get older. There are
some psychological studies showing a negative correlation between performance and age. Mitchell
(1988) found that older workers are more likely to get injured in an industrial accident.
One possibility for raising employment levels of the elderly without imposing a higher cost on
firms is to allow the firms to recontract with lower pay their “first-time retirees,” who have worked
for them until mandatory retirement age (Limsdaine and Mitchell (1999)). Note that Japanese firms
can lower the wages of elderly workers once they have reached their mandatory retirement age.
This is very different from the case in many other countries, including the U.S., where law and
custom bar employers from cutting older workers’ pay and benefits when they reach a certain age.
A wage reduction on reemployment could, however, decrease the labor supply of elderly workers
after mandatory retirement. Theoretically, the higher the wages being offered, the more likely the
elderly will decide to work. Several studies show that labor income has a positive and significant
effect on the decision to work (for the Japanese elderly, for example, see Tachibanaki and Shimono
(1994), Higuchi and Yamamoto (2002)). Okunishi (2001) indicated that wage reduction reduces
the number of the applicants for reemployment at their current firm. On the other hand, Oishi
(2000) and Higuchi et al. (2006) reported that labor income does not have a significant effect on the
decision to work for elderly Japanese people.
This paper examines the Japanese reemployment system after mandatory retirement, using two
large cross-sectional microdata sets for Japanese firms and workers gathered in 1998. This paper
also examines how such a reemployment system, particularly with respect to wage reduction, affects
a worker’s incentive to continue to work at the current firm after mandatory retirement, controlling
for nonwage characteristics of employers and employees.
To preview the main findings of this paper, we show that there is a considerable wage reduc-
tion for reemployees relative to the level in effect just before mandatory retirement. In addition,
the steeper the slope of the wage profile until mandatory retirement, the greater will be the wage
reduction on reemployment. We further find that the older workers in small and mid-size firms
do not necessarily leave their current firm after mandatory retirement, even though their wages on
reemployment dramatically decrease.
There are two major contributions of this paper. First, there has been no analysis of the relation-
ship between the wage path before mandatory retirement and after mandatory retirement using a
large microdata set for Japanese firms with a reemployment system. Although there have been many
studies on employment schemes before mandatory retirement, few studies have analyzed employ-
ment schemes after mandatory retirement. Secondly, there have been no studies on the labor supply
of elderly Japanese people, controlling for both the employers’ characteristics, which include wage
changes before and after mandatory retirement, and the employees’ characteristics.
kajitani : 2006/11/22(0:40)
December 2006 Japan’s Reemployment System and Work Incentives for the Elderly ? 53 ?
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we clarify the features of the
Japanese reemployment system. In Section 3, we describe the estimation model of the elderly
workers’ decision on whether to work (hereafter, working decision) at their current firms, and the
data source and the variables’ definitions, and we present the obtained results in Section 4. The last
section concludes the paper.
2 Japan’s Reemployment System
Most Japanese firms have a reemployment system which offers their “first-time retirees” an em-
ployment opportunity after mandatory retirement.1 The “Personnel Management Survey (Ko¯yo
Kanri Cho¯sa)” (hereafter referred to as PMS) conducted in 2004 reported that 67.4% of Japanese
firms have a reemployment system (77.5% of firms with more than 5,000 employees, 69.2% of
those with 1,000–4,999 employees, 69.0% of those with 300–999 employees, and 70.8% of those
with 100–299 employees reemploy their first-time retirees).
There are some distinctive features of the Japanese reemployment system. First, most Japanese
firms reemploy their first-time retirees using short-term contracts. The PMS of 2003 surveyed firms
that had a reemployment system to obtain details of the terms of their contracts with their first-time
retirees. The results showed that 86.6% of firms with more than 5,000 employees, 78.8% of those
with 1,000–4,999 employees, 78.1% of those with 300–999 employees, and 70.0% of those with
100–299 employees reemploy their first-time retirees using short-term (within one year) contracts.
Second, Japanese firms selectively reemploy their first-time retirees. The PMS of 2003 showed that,
while one-fourth of the small or mid-size firms that had a reemployment system hired applicants for
reemployment without setting any conditions, the remaining three-fourths restricted the applicants
according to some particular criteria.
To provide more details about the Japanese reemployment system, we used a large cross-sectional
microdata set for Japanese firms, the “1998 Employer Survey on Continuing Employment of the
Elderly (Ko¯-nenrei Ju¯gyo¯in no Keizoku Koyo¯ ni kansuru Kigyo¯ Cho¯sa)” (hereafter referred to as
ESCEE–1), which was provided by the Japan Organization for Employment of the Elderly and
Persons with Disabilities (Ko¯rei Sho¯gai-sha Koyo¯ Shien Kiko¯)(hereafter referred to as JEED) and
the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University
of Tokyo (hereafter referred as the SSJ Data Archive). The ESCEE–1 randomly surveyed 33,339
firms, each of which employed 100 or more employees in each prefecture and obtained 18,542
respondents. The ESCEE–1 includes items on the average rate of reduction in wages compared to
the wage at age 55 and the work intensity on reemployment, which includes such parameters as the
number of hours worked and the workers’ responsibilities.
1 Some firms implement an employment scheme called “employment extension.” However, many of the firms with this
scheme change working conditions, including wages, after mandatory retirement. In this paper, we regard “employment
extension” as reemployment.
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Table 1: The rate of wage change on reemployment by selective and
unselective firms (in %)
firm size Up Not Under 10-20% 20-30% 30-50% 50+% otherwise
change 10% down down down down down
Selective 1,000+ 2.7 5.5 2.4 14.3 26.2 23.5 8.5 16.8
firms 100-999 2.1 8.2 4.1 18.3 24.2 19.2 5.0 18.9
Unselective 1,000+ 0.8 15.0 6.0 14.3 21.8 14.3 9.8 18.0
firms 100-999 2.0 17.4 7.0 21.9 19.7 11.8 2.6 17.6
Source: the ESCEE-1
Table 1 shows the wage change ratio after mandatory retirement. Of large firms, 16.7–20.3% with
more than 1,000 employees cut the wage prior to mandatory retirement by 1–20%, 21.8–26.2% of
them cut it by 20–30% and 24.1–32.0% of them cut it by more than 30%. As for small or mid-
sized firms, 22.4–28.9% of them cut the wage by 1–20%, 19.7–24.2% of them cut it by 20–30%
and 14.4–24.2% of them cut it by more than 30%. Large firms considerably reduce more workers’
wages in the post-mandatory-retirement period than do small or mid-size firms. In addition, 5.5–
8.2% of the firms with selective reemployment display no wage reduction, while 15.0–17.4% of the
firms that are not selective pay the same wage as before mandatory retirement. The wage reduction
rate of the selective firms is higher than that of the unselective firms. It could be that the selective
firms wish to discourage employees from continuing to work after mandatory retirement, while
paying lip service to their reemployment policy.
How does the wage path of the reemployed workers change throughout their lifetime of work at
their current firms? Figure 1 shows the relationship between the slope of the wage profile up to
mandatory retirement and the wage reduction rate on reemployment. The steeper the slope of the
wage profile up to mandatory retirement, the more the wage on reemployment decreases. This is
found to be true both for selective and unselective firms.
Source: the ESCEE-1
Figure 1: The slope of the wage profile by the reduction rate of wages
after mandatory retirement (firm size total)
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The slope of the wage profile before mandatory retirement differs considerably among industries.
The ESCEE–1 shows that the slope of wage profile of the firms in the finance, insurance, and real
estate sector is the steepest, while that of the firms in the transportation and telecommunication
sector is the flattest. The relationship in Figure 1 suggests that the degree of wage reduction varies
among industries. Table 2 shows the wage change ratio after mandatory retirement for four indus-
tries. 10.2–26.7% of the firms in the transportation and telecommunication sector have no wage
reduction. In contrast, 45.0–48.4% of the firms in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector cut
wages by more than 30%.
Table 2: The rate of wage change on reemployment by selective and
unselective firms (by industries, firm-size total, in %)
Industries Up Not Under 10-20% 20-30% 30-50% 50+% otherwise
change 10% down down down down down
Construction 2.4 7.8 3.8 21.4 25.5 16.1 2.4 20.6
Manufacturing 2.5 5.6 3.8 19.6 28.0 19.6 4.5 16.4
Selective Transportation and
firms telecommunication 0.7 10.2 6.8 20.6 21.7 17.1 5.3 17.6
Finance, insurance
and real estate 1.6 3.2 0.3 9.1 18.2 32.2 16.2 19.2
Construction 1.2 17.4 7.5 24.5 17.8 8.3 0.0 23.3
Manufacturing 2.0 13.4 6.8 25.1 22.2 12.4 2.3 15.8
Unselective Transportation and
firms telecommunication 1.2 26.7 9.3 19.8 15.9 6.7 0.9 19.5
Finance, insurance
and real estate 0.0 2.5 2.5 15.0 17.5 25.0 20.0 17.5
Source: the ESCEE-1
There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, work responsibilities before and
after mandatory retirement may differ among industries and occupations. For example, some em-
ployees – e.g., bank clerks – tend to take on increasing responsibilities when they are young (before
mandatory retirement), but are assigned relatively light work when they are older (after mandatory
retirement). Other workers – e.g., taxi drivers – have a constant level of responsibility irrespective
of whether they are working before or after mandatory retirement. If the firms pay the employees
in proportion to their responsibilities, we will see a positive relationship between a steep upward
wage profile before mandatory retirement and the big reduction in wages thereafter, depending on
the particular worker’s responsibilities.
As an alternative explanation, the difficulty in monitoring the employees’ work performance may
differ among industries and occupations. As Lazear (1979) argued, the firms in which the costs of
monitoring the employees’ performance are higher would set a steeper upward wage profile and
thereby provide a work incentive to the employees. This is possible under long-term contracts but
not under short-term contracts. As already pointed out, most firms in Japan reemploy their first-
time retirees under short-term contracts. Under the short-term contracts on reemployment, firms
can offer workers light, less difficult work, for which the costs of performance monitoring would be
lower. In this case, the firms also reduce wages in proportion to the workers’ level of responsibility.
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Table 3: The Changes in Working-time and Responsibilities on reemploy-
ment by the rate of wage change on reemployment (firm-size total, in %)
Rate of wage change
Increase Not Under 10% 10–20% 20–30% 30–50% 50+%
A: Selective firms change decrease decrease decrease decrease decrease
1: Working hours
Not change 32.1 87.5 90.5 88.9 84.8 80.6 60.9
Shorten 67.9 11.8 8.5 8.9 12.8 16.7 35.4
2: Responsibilities
Not change 96.6 94.7 70.3 59.0 47.7 38.3 28.5
Reduce the burden of jobs 2.5 4.5 24.9 35.1 42.6 48.9 47.8
Redeploy to other parts 0.0 0.1 2.1 2.5 5.2 7.2 13.7
B: Unselective firms
1: Working hours
Not change 41.3 92.7 91.3 89.6 88.3 78.4 55.6
Shorten 56.5 6.9 8.3 9.4 10.3 18.9 41.1
2: Responsibilities
Not change 100 93.8 76.0 62.3 49.2 46.1 27.5
Reduce the burden of jobs 0.0 5.1 20.9 32.5 43.0 44.2 38.5
Redeploy to other parts 0.0 0.9 2.7 2.3 4.4 5.1 17.6
Source: the ESCEE-1
Table 3 shows the changes in working hours and responsibilities on reemployment by the rate of
wage change on reemployment. A few firms reduce the number of hours worked, when they reduce
wages on reemployment (see panel A–1 and B–1 in Table 3). In contrast, the greater the wage
reduction on reemployment, the more the firms will reduce workers’ responsibilities on reemploy-
ment. This is found regardless of whether firms use selection criteria upon reemploying workers
(see panel A–2 and B–2 in Table 3). Many reemployed elderly are required to work the same
number of hours as before mandatory retirement, but are given fewer responsibilities.
3 Empirical Model and Data Description
3.1 The Estimation Model of the Elderly Workers’ Working Decisions
The previous section showed that many Japanese firms adopt a reemployment system, and most
of them reduce the wages of the reemployed workers without reducing working hours. How does
the wage reduction affect the workers’ working decisions? We examine the elderly workers’ in-
centive to work after mandatory retirement using two large microdata sets, which are described in
the next subsection. The survey first asks the workers before mandatory retirement whether they
want to work after mandatory retirement or retire completely. Then, those who want to work after
mandatory retirement are asked whether they want to remain at their current firm after mandatory
retirement or want to change jobs. We estimate their working decision by means of a recursive
model following Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981).
We assume that there exists a latent variable y∗i that measures the worker’s incentive to work for
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his/her current firm after mandatory retirement and consider the following equation:
y∗i = Xiβ + u1i, (1)
such that we observe only the binary outcome yi,
yi = 1 if y∗i > 0, and yi = 0 otherwise.
The binary variable yi corresponds to “would like to continue to work at the current firm (= 1)”
and “would like to change jobs (= 0)”. The decision of continuing to work at the current firm is
made only if z∗i > 0, where z∗i is taken from the following retirement incentive equation (selection
equation):
z∗i = Wiα + u2i. (2)
The latent variable z∗i is linked to the observed binary variable zi indicating “would like to work
after mandatory retirement (= 1)” and “would like to retire completely (= 0)”,
zi = 1 if z∗i > 0, and zi = 0 otherwise.
Thus, there are three types of observations in the sample: 1) would like to continue to work for
his/her current firm, 2) would like to change jobs, and 3) would like to retire completely. The log
likelihood is:
∑
i∈S
yi=1
ln[Φ2(Xiβ,Wiα, ρ)] +
∑
i∈S
yi=0
ln[Φ2(−Xiβ,Wiα,−ρ)] +
∑
iS
ln[1 −Φ(Wiα)], (3)
where S is the set of observations that involve working after mandatory retirement, Φ2 is the cumu-
lative bivariate normal distribution function, Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function, ρ is
a correlation coefficient and an unobserved error term: u1i, u0i ∼ BVN(0, 0, 1, 1, ρ).
Xi and Wi represent observable vectors of explanatory variables. The first important explanatory
variable is the wage reduction after mandatory retirement. As explained in Section 1, the wage
reduction can discourage the elderly to work for their current firms after mandatory retirement. This
is because a larger wage reduction on reemployment will induce an increase in foregone income,
even after controlling for other characteristics. Note, however, that the firms could reduce wages
more in order for workers to receive subsidies or to avoid forfeiting employee’s pension benefits.2
Some firms may control a worker’s wage after the age of 60 to maximize the sum of employment
income and subsidies and the employee’s pension benefits. In this case, the wage reduction will
encourage the elderly to work for their current firms after mandatory retirement. We cannot control
2 Workers reemployed after the age of 60 can receive subsidies called “benefits of employment extension for the elderly
(Ko¯-nenrei Koyo¯ Keizoku Kyu¯fu)” in situations when the wage after the age of 60 is less than 85% of the wage at the age
of 60. In 1998, although employees’ pension eligibility age was 60, the pension payment of elderly workers was reduced
depending on their labor income from the age of 60 to the age of 65 (“Old-age Pension for Active Employees (Zaishoku
Ro¯rei Nen-kin).”)
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for this effect, since the information on subsidies and employee’s pension benefits is not available.
We must consider this point carefully when interpreting the estimation results.
Another important explanatory variable is the type of the reemployment system. If working
hours or working days become short, the elderly workers might want to continue to work, and if
their working responsibilities are reduced, the elderly workers may desire to remain at their current
firm after mandatory retirement. If this pattern of work suits elderly workers’ needs, the workers
will want to work for their current firm after mandatory retirement.
We also control the variables related to the firm’s other characteristics. Not only the wage after
mandatory retirement but also the wage before mandatory retirement can affect the elderly workers’
incentive to work. However, as mentioned in Section 2, the slope of the wage profile until manda-
tory retirement is correlated to the wage reduction on reemployment. If we include the slope of the
wage profile until mandatory retirement as a control variable as well as the wage reduction, this
variable is redundant, as it introduces a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we include the wage
at the age of 55 as a control variable to control the wage before mandatory retirement.
Moreover, the existence of an early retirement system can affect labor decisions. Some Japanese
firms have preferential treatment for severance pay for early retirees (for example, premium sever-
ance pay). When the workers want to change jobs after mandatory retirement, they would leave the
current firm if they receive a premium severance payment.
As previous studies suggest, we control the other variables related to workers’ characteristics,
such as health status, family needs, and pension. Particularly, as Abe (1998), Higuchi and Ya-
mamoto (2002), and Higuchi et al. (2006) indicate, pension benefits reduce the probability of the
Japanese elderly working. This is what Feldstein (1974) originally showed, i.e., that generous so-
cial benefits reduce the incentive to work. We control for whether a worker can receive a pension
at mandatory retirement age, because the pensionable age for the flat-rate basic pension benefits
is staggered from 60 to 65 years of age although many Japanese firms do not extend mandatory
retirement age. For exclusion restrictions, which are included in Wi and excluded from Xi, we
use dummy variables indicating retirement reasons: W1i in Wi. These dummy variables affect the
general work incentive rather than continuity of working at the current firm.3
3.2 The Data
We use two large cross-sectional microdata sets for Japanese firms and workers. One is the
ESCEE–1, which is described in Section 2, and the other is the “1998 Employee Survey on Contin-
uing Employment of the Elderly (Ko¯-nenrei Ju¯gyo¯in no Keizoku Koyo¯ ni kansuru Jyu¯gyo¯in Ishiki
Cho¯sa)” (hereafter referred to as ESCEE–2), which were provided by the JEED and the SSJ Data
Archive.
The ESCEE–2 has the following advantages. The ESCEE–2 asks current workers (those who
have not reached mandatory retirement age) about whether they want to work after mandatory
3 We regress yi on Xi and W1i using a probit model, in order to check whether W1i in the selection equation are not contained
in the outcome equation. Null hypothesis:“the parameters of W1i are zero” is accepted.
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retirement. There are very few surveys that have asked workers who are below the age of first
retirement about their future incentive to work after the first retirement, although there have been
a few surveys asking “after-the-first-retirement” workers about their current working status. If we
use the elderly workers’ current working status, we cannot distinguish a worker’s incentive to work,
which is a labor supply effect, from labor demand effects, since the current working status denotes
the outcome of both effects. Using the worker’s incentive to work, we can examine the pure labor
supply effects.
We merge the ESCEE–1 with the ESCEE–2 (the merged data is hereafter referred to as the
ESCEE), utilizing the identification of the firm where the individual is working. We restrict the
sample to individuals who work for firms that have a reemployment system after the mandatory
retirement age, because we examine how the reemployment system affects the workers’ decisions
to continue to work for their current firm after mandatory retirement. In addition, we restrict the
sample to male workers. By further restricting the sample only to answers to the questions we need
for the estimation, the sample size becomes 8,394.4
The dependent variable in the retirement incentive equation (equation (2)) is the Incentive to work
after mandatory retirement. The ESCEE asks the worker: “Up to what age do you want to work?”
If the worker’s age is over the mandatory retirement age, we can say that he wants to work after
mandatory retirement. The question then arises of how many years the workers want to continue to
work after mandatory retirement. The ESCEE shows that 23% of the workers want to work for up
to five years and 34.4% of the workers want to continue to work long after mandatory retirement,
though 30% of the employees want to retire at mandatory retirement. We set the variable as one
to indicate that the worker desires to work after mandatory retirement, and zero otherwise. The
dependent variable in the equation (1), is the Incentive to work for the current firm after mandatory
retirement. The ESCEE asks “Do you want to continue to work for your current workplace after
mandatory retirement?” We set the variable as one if the worker answers “yes,” and zero otherwise.
4 The ESCEE–2 first selects 1,146 firms according to size of the firms and industrial classifications and surveys 108,125
workers at 1,146 firms. Workers vary among age groups 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, and 55–59, between white- and blue-collar
workers and among positions. The number of responses obtained was 74,253.
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Table 4 summarizes the details of the variables used in the analysis. Note that we cannot observe
from the ESCEE the wage of the individual worker, but we can see the average wage index at
ages 25, 35, 45, and 55 in each firm. We calculate the expected wage at age 55 in each firm
using the wage index and the “1998 Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Chin-gin Ko¯zo¯ Kihon To¯kei
Cho¯sa)” conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. In addition, we include the wage
difference index at age 55 (considering the average wage at age 55 as 100) as the independent
variable to control wage variation among individuals in each firm.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics by firm sizes. In large firms, the ratio of workers who
want to work after mandatory retirement is 67%, and 44% of workers desire to continue to work
for their current firms. Among small or mid-size firms, 54% of the workers who want to work
after mandatory retirement, which is 65% of the sample in small or mid-size firms, desire to be
reemployed by their current firms.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variables Large firm Small/mid size firm
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variable
equation (1)
Incentive to work for the current firm after MR* 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.50
equation (2)
Incentive to work after MR 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48
Independent Variables
Wage reduction after MR(%) 29.54 12.71 26.51 14.77
Decrease in working time after MR 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35
Decrease in responsibilities after MR 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.50
Wage at age 55 ( ten thousand yen) ** 1014.79 253.94 857.22 219.78
The wage difference index at age 55 51.68 30.93 33.76 27.42
Without selection criteria 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.42
The expected business performance in the next 5 years −0.28 1.05 −0.24 0.99
Major cities 0.49 0.50 0.30 0.46
Preferential treatment of severance pay for early re-
tirees
0.39 0.49 0.18 0.39
Univ.-graduates 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.46
Housing loan 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
Awareness of health status 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48
Caregiver 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50
Age 49.41 5.35 49.59 5.48
Tenure 23.55 9.71 21.49 10.30
Nonclerical worker 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49
Managerial position 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45
Cannot receive a pension, when retiring at the MR age 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.36
Because I can live on property revenue 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Because I can no longer apply my skills or knowledge 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
The number of Observations 3064 5330
Note:
1) * The number of observations in equation (1) are 2045 and 3468, respectively.
2) ** In 1998, 1 dollar = 130.91 yen on average.
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4 Estimation Results
Because of the existence of large differentials in observed and unobserved firm characteristics,
such as working environments and benefits packages between large and small/mid-size firms, we
conduct the estimation separately for large and small/mid-size firms. Table 6 reports the marginal
effects evaluated at the mean of other covariates.
Table 6: Estimation results (Dependent Variable: Incentive to work for the
current firm after MR)
(1) Large firm (2) Small/mid-size firm
Independent Variables Marginal Eff. Robust S.E. Marginal Eff. Robust S.E.
Wage reduction after MR −0.0037*** 0.0008 −0.0007 0.0006
Decrease in working time after MR# 0.0706*** 0.0274 0.0167 0.0217
Decrease in responsibilities after MR# −0.0068 0.0177 −0.0059 0.0151
Wage at age 55 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0001** 0.0000
The wage difference index at age 55 −0.0002 0.0003 0.0007*** 0.0003
Without selection criteria # 0.0716** 0.0315 0.0854*** 0.0172
The expected business performance in the
next 5 years
−0.0038 0.0093 −0.0037 0.0070
Major cities # −0.0059 0.0175 0.0816*** 0.0156
Preferential treatment of severance pay for
early retirees #
−0.0882*** 0.0202 −0.0783*** 0.0175
Univ.-graduates # −0.0526*** 0.0195 0.0004 0.0166
Housing loan # 0.1165*** 0.0232 0.1177*** 0.0178
Awareness of health status # 0.0298* 0.0178 0.0414*** 0.0142
Caregiver # −0.0268 0.0176 −0.0270* 0.0139
Age 0.0165*** 0.0020 0.0159*** 0.0015
Tenure −0.0040*** 0.0011 −0.0032*** 0.0008
Nonclerical worker # 0.0379* 0.0208 0.0468*** 0.0159
Managerial position # 0.0202 0.0222 −0.0535*** 0.0176
Cannot receive a pension, when retiring at
the MR age #
0.0851*** 0.0257 0.1497*** 0.0185
Number of observations 3064 5330
Number of uncensored obs. 2045 3468
Number of censored obs. 1019 1862
Wald χ2 152.12*** 207.83***
Log pseudo-likelihood −3121.366 −5477.605
Wald test H0 : ρ = 0 (p-value) 0.95 0.58
Predicted Pr(y1i = 1, y0i = 1) 0.28 0.36
Note:
1) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
2) # ∂F/∂x is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, theoretically wage reduction has both negative and positive effects
on labor supply. The negative signs of the Wage reduction after mandatory retirement variable in
columns (1) and (2) show that the former effect exceeds the latter effect. The sign of the Wage
reduction after mandatory retirement variable is significant at the 1% level in column (1) but in-
significant in column (2). The workers do not wish to work at their current large firms after manda-
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tory retirement, if these large firms reduce the wage on reemployment. However, wage reduction
on reemployment does not necessarily make the workers in small/mid-size firms leave their current
firm. There is less wage reduction on reemployment in small/mid-size firms rather than in large
firms as we point out in Table 1. “First retirees” can receive unemployment insurance benefits that
are 50–80% of their wage immediately before mandatory retirement in 1998. They could leave
their current firms and receive the benefit, if the benefit is more than the wage on reemployment.
The sign of the Decrease in working time after mandatory retirement variable is insignificant
in column (2), but significantly positive at the 1% level in column (1). The sign of the Decrease
in responsibilities after mandatory retirement variable is insignificant in both columns (1) and (2).
That is, workers do not react to the reduction in responsibilities or working time on reemployment,
at least in small or mid-size firms.5
The Preferential treatment of severance pay for early retirees variable has a significantly negative
effect in both columns (1) and (2). Workers who want to change jobs after mandatory retirement
have an incentive to leave their current firm, before mandatory retirement, if the current firm offers
premium severance pay. The Nonclerical worker variable has a positive effect at the 1–10% sig-
nificance level in columns (1) and (2). The workers, who are salespersons, guards, taxi drivers, or
craftspeople, etc., want to work at their current firms after mandatory retirement.
The sign of the Cannot receive a pension, when retiring at the mandatory retirement age variable
is positive and significant at the 1% level in both columns (1) and (2). This is also significantly
positive in the retirement incentive equation (equation (2)).6 The extended age for the pension
provides not only an incentive to work for current firm after mandatory retirement but also incentive
to work after mandatory retirement for the Japanese elderly.
Generally, the closer the workers are to the mandatory retirement age, the more new information
they will gain about their living standards after mandatory retirement. We conduct the estimation by
restricting the sample closer to mandatory retirement age (among workers whose remaining years to
reach the mandatory retirement age is 1–5 years). The estimated results of the Decrease in working
time after mandatory retirement, Decrease in responsibilities after mandatory retirement and Wage
reduction after mandatory retirement variables are similar to the results using the full sample.
Many Japanese firms lower the wages of workers once they have reached their mandatory re-
tirement age. This is a distinctive feature of Japan’s reemployment system. The reemployment
mechanism is able to prevent firms from “overpaying” the employees. However, a wage reduc-
tion on reemployment could decrease the incentive to continue to work in their current firms. If
this is true, the Japanese reemployment system with a wage reduction may not be effective. This
5 As mentioned in Section 2, because the wage reduction is correlated to responsibilities on reemployment or with/without
selection criteria, there may be a multicollinearity problem. We check the applicability of an additional specification:
1) excluding the Decrease in responsibilities after mandatory retirement variable and 2) excluding the Without selection
criteria variable from the estimation equations in Table 6. There is little difference in the signs and levels of significance
of the Wage reduction after mandatory retirement variable.
6 The estimation results of retirement incentive equation (equation (2)) are not reported. Marginal effects of Cannot receive
a pension, when retiring at the mandatory retirement age variable in the equation (2) are 0.224 and 0.257, robust standard
errors are 0.033 and 0.022 respectively.
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is because a considerable wage reduction will make the employees with better work performance
leave their current firms at mandatory retirement, i.e., the “first” retirement. The estimation results
suggest that the wage reduction on reemployment does not necessarily make elderly workers in
small and mid-size firms leave their current firm after mandatory retirement. That is, the Japanese
reemployment system with a wage reduction could be effective for small and medium firms.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper first summarizes the characteristics of Japan’s reemployment system. The most strik-
ing feature of Japan’s reemployment system is the wage reduction for reemployed workers com-
pared with the wage immediately before mandatory retirement. Using a large microdata set on
firms, we found that more than 60% of the firms with a reemployment system reduced wages in
this situation, and that large firms reduce wages after mandatory retirement more than small or
mid-sized firms do. Moreover, the steeper the slope of the wage path up to mandatory retirement,
the more the wage on reemployment decreases. Japanese firms can thus prevent overpayment by
reducing wages on reemployment.
However, this wage reduction could lower elderly workers’ incentive to work. According to the
estimation results obtained in this paper, the Japanese older workers in large firms show a lower
incentive to work as their wages are reduced. On the other hand, we find that the older workers
in small and mid-size firms do not necessarily withdraw from their current firm after mandatory
retirement when their wage on reemployment decreases. The Japanese reemployment system with
a wage reduction could therefore be effective for small and medium firms.
(Graduate Student, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)
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